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Contemporary radical literature on education, drawing on a 
variety of Marxist theories, holds the view that 'liberal theory 
of education' has been successfully discredited. This thesis 
challenges this view, arguing that it is based on a mistaken 
characterisation of the liberal position.
Having listed the objections, typical in the radical literature, 
against 'liberal theory of education1, the discussion moves to a 
consideration of how the liberal point of view should be 
characterised. Taking John Locke and John Stuart Mill as 
examples from the liberal tradition, it is argued that what 
characterises the liberal point of view is that its central and 
most fundamental feature is the defence of the principle of 
individual freedom. This must be distinguished from particular 
expressions of the liberal point of view, which vary according to 
historical circumstances, It is a mistake to treat one of these 
particular expressions of liberalism, e.g. Mill's views on the 
franchise, as a timeless statement of the liberal position. 
Similarly, 'liberal theory oi education' should not be Identified 
with, for example, the cap"' ist assumption that schooling 
contributes to 'economic growth1.
An examination of radical attacks on two supposed areas of 
'liberal theory of education1 follows. Firstly* the ideas of 
P. H. Hirst and R. S. Peters, whom the radical critics treat as 
'liberal philosophers of education', are shown to be more 
appropriately described as conservative than liberal, in the
fundamental respect of the notion of education which they hold. 
The alleged inadequacy of their mode of argument establishes 
neither the deficiency of 'analytic' philosophy nor the
inadequacy of 'liberal philosophy of education'. It is
demonstrated that P. S. Wilson and John White, in defending, in 
different ways* the central liberal principle of individual 
freedom, are better examples of liberal philosophers of 
education. Secondly, it is shown that, contrary to current 
radical opinion, the dominant tradition in studies of education 
in South Africa is not a liberal one. Most examples cited by the 
radicals from this alleged liberal tradition are more 
appropriately described as conservative, and at least one as
reactionary. In the course of advancing this part of the 
argument mistaken assumptions and weaknesses of characterisation 
of 'liberalism' on the part of radical critics are exposed.
What characteristics would a liberal notion of education have, 
given that the liberal position in theory of education has been 
so mischaracteriscd? A formal account is given of a liberal
notion of education as primarily concerned with the development 
of the autonomy of the individual. The kind of 'individualism'
suggested by this notion is explored, and a liberal notion of 
education is dissociated from the major strands in the history of 
individualist ideas, although they themselves tended to reflect 
liberal principles.
While radical attacks on 'liberal theory of education' prompt the 
assumption that liberalism and Marxism would offer very different 
notions of education, this is also mistaken. Analysis of the 
Marxist notion of polytechnic education shows similarities 
between most features of polytechnic education and the genuine 
liberal notion of education held by John White. Having dispelled 
the assumption that liberalism and Marxism are likely to generate 
very different notions of education, the discussion turns finally 
to advance the argument that because of a tension between the 
aims of democratic participation and revolutionary change, there 
are grounds for holding that Marxism cannot offer a coherent 
notion of education.
It is misguided to assume that liberal theory of education should 
be abandoned in favour of Marxist theory. The latter's 
perceptive analyses of schooling in capitalist society are not 
necessarily incompatible with a liberal notion of education. It 
is misguided to assume, and to offer to students of education, a 
straightforward choice between these two positions, especially 
given the flawed and often unrigorous characterisation of 
'liberal theory of education1 offered by those who posit such a 
choice.
I declare that this dissertation is my own, unaided work. 
It is being submitted for the degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy in the University of the Witwatersrand, 
Johannesburg. It has not been submitted before for any 
degree or examination in any other University, nor has it 
been prepared under the aegis or with the assistance of any 
other body or organization or person outside the University 
of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg.
PREFACE
It is widely observed that schooling in South Africa is in a 
state of crisis. Many of the injustices of South African society 
coalesce around its schooling system; inferior schooling for 
blacks has been essential to the perpetuation of a social system 
in which most have been denied all but the most menial and 
low-paid work, with profound consequences in terms of their life 
chances. While white children have had greater access to 
schooling, the schooling they have received has tended more 
towards indoctrination than education.
In the face of these and other aspects of the crisis the dilemmas 
and responsibilities confronting those Involved in teacher 
education and the study of education in South Africa are 
particularly awesome* One way of facing these problems has been 
the suggestion that in both the academic study of education and 
In teacher education what is required is a radical approach, 
Inspired by a variety of Marxist positions, which would provide 
better conceptual tools for researchers and future teachers, as 
well as a praxis appropriate to changing South African society. 
Some who have taken this stance have advanced the associated 
argument that 'liberal theory of education' has failed and must 
be rejected in favour of a m>r@ progressive, radical theory of 
education. This thesis is a response to this view, with which I 
wish to take issue. vi
I would like to thank my colleagues in the Department of 
Education at the University of the Witwatersrand for their 
helpful responses to earlier drafts of this thesis, as well as 
Dr John Watt of Murdoch University. Professor David Freer gave 
useful advice on the presentation of the thesis, I am especially 
indebted to my supervisor, Professor Wally Morrow, for his 
guidance and encouragement.
Material from Chapters 3, 4 and 5 respectively has been published 
or accepted for publication as follows! 'The fiberal Point of 
View1, Educational Philosophy and Theory,t Volume 16, Number 2, 
October 1984i 'Are Hirst and Peters Liberal Philosophers of 
Education?', Journal of Philosophy of Education* Volume 19, 
Number 2, 1985 (in press); 'Is the Dominant Tradition in Studies 
of Education in South Africa a Liberal One?1, Perspectives in 
Education. Volume 8, Number 3, July 1985.
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C M  1 
mODtlCTION
Has liberal theory of education anything to contribute to the
study of education in South Africa today? Or is it, as some 
argus, discredited and passe? In the face of the continuing
crisis in education in South Africa one of the issues confronting
those engaged in the study of education concerns the choice of 
appropriate directions for the enterprise of theory of 
education. Here three broad possibilities present themselves, 
each of which gives strong emphasis to the significance of 
education in this country. They could be described as the
paradigms offered by liberal theory. Fundamental Pedagogics and 
radical theory of education. In debates about education at South 
African universities these are the three most obviously 
distinguishable, but not easily charaeterisablo, possibilities.
Fundamental Pedagogics, which shares the anki-liberal position of 
the radical view* has been pursued in isolation from the other 
two paradigms within some of the Afrikaans-medium universities, 
at the University of South Africa and at the tribal 
universities. It has been subject to deserving criticism,(1) 
centrally on the grounds of its role, in spite of its claims to 
be a 'science', in defending the ideology of apartheid and the
• -  '   ----
2unjust schooling system which is an integral part of the status 
quo. But Fundamental Pedagogics id not part of my subject of 
interest here. My concern, rather, is with some matters at 
issue between what I broadly describe as radical and liberal 
approaches to theory of education. More specifically, I am 
interested in a position advanced from a broad radical 
perspective against what is described as 'liberal theory of 
education1. This is the view that liberal theory of education 
has been discredited, and is of no relevance to the study of 
education, or at best is simply a well-meaning but fundamentally 
misguided enterprise. Hand in hand with this stance goes the 
claim that the methods and insights offered by a radical theory 
inspired by a range of Marxist inputs is better equipped and more 
successful than liberal theory, in the study of education no less 
than in a variety of other fields. This thesis will address 
itself to this rejection of liberal theory of education, which it 
will defend, given a certain account of the notion of liberal 
theory of education.
I will begin, in Chapter 2, by sketching the main arguments 
marshalled by the radical critics against what is called ’liberal 
theory of education'. In doing so I will indicate how and where, 
in subsequent chapters, I intend to deal with these arguments.
Chapter 3 takes up the problem of characterising the concept 
'liberal', by examining some aspects of the liberal tradition. 
It shows how examination of the ideas of John Locke and John 
Stuart Mill reveals that: liberal ideas are characterisable in
r . _ — fcJi--a— ."..------------------..**-- -----
terms of the essential, central concern for individual freedom, 
while particular expressions of the liberal point of view vary, 
depending on the historical context in which they are developed. 
The argument questions the validity of identifying the liberal 
point of view with particular expressions of liberal ideas, like
calls for equality of opportunity, or ideas which at times have
been defended in association with liberalism, e.g. the defence of 
capitalism and certain brands of individualism.
The radical tendency to adopt simplistic characterisations of 
liberal ideas is exposed further in the two subsequent chapters. 
Chapter 4 is an examination of the radical argument that the work 
of P. H, Hirst and R. S. Peters(2) as 'liberal philosophers of 
education' is fundamentally conservative, and that this 
conservatism is reflected in their methodology, their 
epistemology and their theory of schooling. It argues both that 
this radical argument is confused, in that there are significant 
differences between liberalism and conservatism, and that if one 
takes into account criticisms of Hirst and Peters from within 
analytic philosophy, their work should not be seen as 
representative and uncontroversial statements of 'liberal 
philosophy of education'. Chapter 5 challenges the radical view 
that the dominant tradition in studios of education in South
Africa is a liberal one. It considers the arguments against, and
implied criteria of, certain studies of education in South Africa 
alleged by the radicals to be 'liberal', It shows that the 
criteria in question are Inadequate and that, taking into account 
the examples cited by the radicals, it is simply wrong, with one
or two individual exceptions, fco hold that the dominant tradition 
in question is a liberal one. This tradition, like the work o£ 
Hirst and Peters, is on the whole more aptly described as 
conservative.
If the argument is that the radicals are mistaken in the examples 
they offer of 'liberal theory of education' in the two cases 
discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, what counts as a correct example? 
Chapter 6 argues that while Hirst and Peters are more 
appropriately described as conservative, P. S. Wilson and John 
White are better examples of liberal philosophers of education. 
By contrast with Hirst and Peters, for whom education is seen as 
initiating pupils into worthwhile activities, identified in terms 
of public traditions and modes of understanding, Wilson's concern 
is that the individual should be enabled to discover her 
interests and to choose for herself to pursue activities 
appropriate to those interests. His emphasis on individual 
freedom in this sense is evidence of a classical liberal 
position. John Wit. e's defence of a compulsory curriculum, 
paradoxical as if may seem, is also a statement of a liberal 
position in that White sees this as being in the interests of 
increasing the freedom of the individual. It is further argued 
that Wilson's, and particularly White'si ideas, have revolutionary 
rather than reformist implications.
While Chapter 3 establishes that the central characteristic of 
the liberal tradition has been its defence of the principle of 
freedom, and while the definitive presence of this principle in a
genuinely liberal notion of education is emphasised in discussing 
Wilson and White, the theme of emphasis on the individual will 
also emerge in Chapter 6. This raises explicitly the radical 
attack, pointed to in Chapter 2, on the alleged individualism 
assumed and defended in liberal theory of education. In taking 
up this issue in Chapter 7, I will show how most threads in the 
history of individualist ideas are incompatible with a genuinely 
liberal notion of education. But I will argue that a rationally 
justifiable notion of education is fundamentally concerned with 
the good of the individual, which consists primarily in helping 
her to exercise autonomy. In its concern for the development of 
the individual's potential such a liberal notion of education has 
much in common wi?:n a Marxist notion of education.
This issue of a Marxist notion of education is the central focus 
of Chapter 8. Here an examination of Marx's notion of 
polytechnic education and of Freire's theory of dialogical 
education shows that such notions have much in common with the 
genuinely liberal view of education found in the ideas of White, 
but a sharp contrast can be drawn between the former and the 
notion of education offered by Hirst and Peters. Further, it is
argued in Chapter 9 that there is an incompatibility in the
Marxist notion of education between the aim of revolution and the
aim of developing each individual's capacity for autonomy. The
ultimate agnosticism of the liberal view enables it to avoid such 
difficulties, and thus to develop a more coherent notion of 
education.
Setting the boundaries of this undertaking is of vital
importance, given that debates and opinions on these two
apparently competing models underlie much of what has taken place 
over a wide variety of disciplines over the last decade or so. 
As a broad spectrum of disciplines and issues is raised when
liberal and Marxist paradigms come into conflict, it is vital to 
keep the limits of the exercise I have in mind both clear and
modest. I do not propose to take on in any global sense the wide 
range of matters at issue between liberalism and Marxism. My 
central focus is a specific issue in theory of education, as 
outlined above*
One needs also to be cautious in using terms like 'liberal' and 
'Marxist'. Such terms cannot be taken for granted. I do not use 
them as transparent labels for positions whose features are given 
or uncontroversial. Indeed one of the major thrusts of my
argument is that there are no simple recipes or brief formulae 
which can successfully encompass the meaning of the term
'liberal', or the term 'Marxist1. The radical tendency is to be 
more sympathetic to the latter than to the former. Furthermore, 
it is obvious that within the range of views which could be
described as 'liberal1 on the one hand and 'Marxist' on the other
there are debates about what these positions can and should 
involve. The Identity, then, of both 'liberalism' and 'Marxism' 
is controversial. My main Interest is In the identity of the 
liberal position, as it is an attack on this position which is 
the subject of this thesis. I am therefore going to pay more 
attention to the problems of characterising the liberal point of
7My goal is not to settle once and for all the basic disagreements 
between liberal and Marxist ideas. It is, more modestly, to 
challenge the particular radical view of liberal theory of 
education which I have raised and the presuppositions on which 
this view rests. It calls for a serious re-examination of the 
relevance of liberal ideas to the study of education, and hence 
of what has become one of the dominant orthodoxies of the moment.
Notes
(1) See: E. N. G. Beard and W. E. Morrow (eds.), Problems of
Pedagogics (1981); Penny Enslin, 'The Role of Fundamental
Pedagogics in the Formulation of Educational Policy in
South Africa1 (1984).
(2) Criticisms of the work of Hirst and Peters are directed
at: Paul H. Hirst, 'Liberal Education and the Nature of
Knowledge' (1974); R. S. Peters, Ethics and Education
(1966).
I E  ALLEGED POVERTY OF LIBERAL THEORY OF EDUCATION
1
In challenging the relevance of liberal theory of education to
the study of education, radical critlcs(l) attribute to it
certain mistaken assumptions and arguments, whose mistakenness is 
alleged to establish that liberal theory of education is passe, 
and that it has far less to offer than a radical theory. In 
setting about the task of defending liberal theory of education, 
I shall begin by making a reasonably comprehensive catalogue of 
the arguments and assumptions which radicals attribute to liberal 
theorists. The purpose of this catalogue is not to provide a 
programme for the remainder of the thesis. I shall not discuss 
all these items in the thesis. The purpose of the catalogue is 
simply to display the range of the radical critique. I will
gather these arguments and assumptions under seven headings in 
section 2 below, sketching the grounds on which the critics
object to them.
Before moving on to this catalogue of alleged features of liberal 
theory of education, two remarks are in order. Firstly, while 1 
will indicate the central radical assumptions about both theory
of education and liberal theory of education, I do not want to 
suggest that I am handling here a unified radical view. The 
attacks on liberal theory of education have been gathered from 
various contemporary sources. Secondly, what I tackle here is 
not a 1 review of the literature' but an attempt to pick out the 
major radical arguments in question and to sketch them from the 
inside. The aim is to set up the central issues at stake in the 
chapters which follow. In section 3 I will indicate where and 
how in those chapters 1 intend to respond to the radical view of 
liberal theory of education and its main assumptions and 
arguments. Some of the seven headings below will be treated in 
more detail then others in subsequent chapters, and I will 
indicate why,
2
(i) The ecpngmic,growth_argument
According to liberal theorists, their critics argue, schooling 
contributes to economic growth, to the benefit of all. It can be 
seen to do so in two ways. Firstly, efficient schooling 
contributes directly to the growth of technology by providing the 
necessary expertise and skills for its development and use. This 
in turn determines the level of economic and therefore social 
progress in a society. Secondly, the role of mass schooling in 
modern society is to help citizens to adjust to the industrial 
system by teaching them the necessary norms and by integrating
them into occupational roles appropriate to their abilities. In
these ways schooling promotes economic progress and so raises the
quality of life for all members of society.
But the reality behind this liberal rhetoric is that in
capitalist liberal democracies(2) the main function of schooling 
is to provide not technical expertise, but particular types of 
people»(3) The social relations of production determine the 
nature of the technology to be employed. Besides which, the myth 
of economic progress for the benefit of all is but an element of 
liberal ideology, disguising the fact that technological and 
economic growth benefit not the masses, but the owners of the 
means of production. And teaching the masses the 'necessary 
norms' would be more accurately described as maintaining the 
existing social relations of production. The function of
schooling is control, not economic and social progress.
(11) The equality argument
The liberal view of education argues that some redress for life's 
unequal chances may be achieved through educational 
opportunities* By providing equality of opportunity, those with 
ability, assisted by objective selection procedures, have the 
chance to succeed, and each is allocated to her appropriate role 
in life. According to this meritocratic view, children with 
ability from poor backgrounds may enter the growing middle 
class, Thus the educational system provides for social mobility, 
dependent on individual talent and industry.
But, far from providing equal opportunity, education in 
capitalist liberal democracies ensures effective social control. 
Schooling slots children into the occupational hierarchy, which 
reflects the class structure. In the vast majority of cases, 
occupation is determined by class, prevailing notions of ability 
being mere reflections of dominant middle class values. Indeed 
it has been demonstrated(4) that ability is less relevant than 
class in determining a child's place in the occupational 
hierarchy. Furthermore the role of psychology and its various 
selection procedures, and of 'educational experts' in general, 
have now been shown to be far from neutral and objective.(5)
Liberal theory has failed to understand the nature and 
significance of cultural and class differences in attempting to 
account for the failure of working-class children compared with 
middle-class children.(6)
(ill) The liberal view of knowledKQ and education
The liberal view of knowledge, which according to some Marxist 
critica(7) has become dominant in universities end colleges of 
education, is exemplified in the work of the liberal 
philosophers, Hirst and Peters, "The critics focus on Hirst's 
notion of forms of knowledge and Peters's view of education as 
initiation into worthwhile activities, and on the broader 
theoretical implications of those two focal points of liberal 
philosophy of education.
Hirst's forms of knowledge thesis is rejected. It is argued that 
Hirst underestimates the difficulties which arise from his 
attribution of independent criteria and distinctive procedures 
and tests of validity to the various forms. His position is seen 
as evidence of the belief that knowledge is objective, absolute 
and given, rather than socially and culturally situated. It also 
indicates a tendency to regard only prepositional knowledge as 
knowledge, and to see the abstract and theoretical as superior to 
practical knowledge.(8)
These errors about the nature of knowledge are incorporated into 
the consequent view that education is initiation into public 
traditions and modes of understanding, which can be identified in 
terms of the forms of knowledge. Liberal education derives 
objectivity from knowledge associated with those public criteria 
and modes of understanding. The curriculum reflects this given 
objective structure of knowledge* and consists of disciplines 
into which the child is to be initiated.(9) By definition 
liberal education justifies itself - it has no extrinsic aim. 
This absolute view of knowledge and education assumes that the 
knowledge and theorising of the teacher is superior to that of 
the pupil.(10) In initiating the child into 'worthwhile 
activities' it imposes on her a particular construction of 
meaning to the exclusion of others,
The liberal philosophers' view of knowledge fails to take into 
account the factor of Ideology, It ignores questions concerning 
the historically and socially determined production, reproduction
and legitimation of knowledge. In assuming that knowledge is 
absolute and autonomous the liberal philosophers fail to realise 
that knowledge reflects the interests of the dominant group in a 
society at a particular time, Hirst makes the mistake of taking 
the very question of the nature of knowledge as his starting 
point in trying to determine the nature of education.(11) A 
materialist analysis of knowledge, by contrast, enables the 
theorist to analyse the ways in which prevalent ideas of 
knowledge are determined by class Interests. It provides the 
conceptual tools to enable one to demonstrate how the dominant 
ideology in a society distorts reality in the interests of the 
ruling class, These Interests are further served by the division 
of knowledge reflected in the structure of academic practice,(12) 
which in turn fragments and dissipates the thrust of professional 
academic work,(13) and in the distinction between mental and 
manual labour. The liberal philosophers fail to see that 
knowledge and schooling are not neutral. Far from promoting 
knowledge, education serves prevailing ideologies, thus promoting 
ignorance.(14) By assuming that education is autonomous, neutral 
and apolitical the liberal philosophers support the existing 
power structure.
(iv) Analytic philosophy as a method
Not only do the liberal philosophers of education err in failing 
to take into account the relevance of Ideology to a theory of 
knowledge, In addition their very activity as theorists requires 
analysis in terms of the production of Ideology. But they do not
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see their work as ideological,(15) as supporting the existing 
structures o£ power. Instead Hirst and Peters claim to use a 
method - analytic philosophy - which is detached and
neutral.(16) From powerful positions as professors at 
respectable universities, and in the Philosophy of Education 
Society of Great Britain, they set the parameters for a method 
which develops the supportive rhetoric which legitimates the 
status quo, and which has provided hardly any genuine insights 
into education.(17) By favouring analysis Hirst and Peters 
support a method which is now discredited.(18) Working within 
the Anglo-American tradition of philosophy, they ignore or 
dismiss the European phenomenological and Marxist traditions,
each of which has offered considerable insights into 
education.(19) From the Marxist point of view liberal philosophy 
of education makes the basic mistake of focussing, as if they are 
free of context* on the inner processes of education,(%0) taking 
ethics and epistcmology as their starting point,(21) rather than 
the relations of production, which are primary.
(v) Liberal defence of the status quo
Education is a political act. Like the state, the law, the
family and other institutions in capitalist liberal democracies, 
it serves the ruling elements in society. This it does by
providing the skills appropriate to the prevailing mode of
production, and by securing prevailing ideologies« Liberal 
theory of education makes a fundamental mistake in its perception 
of the relationship between education and politics, and thus
between education and social change. Failing to see that 
schooling in capitalist liberal democracies, far from being a 
neutral enterprise, independent of politics, is but a reflection 
of the political and economic conditions in a society, the 
liberal theorists mistakenly believe that education can bring 
about social change.
While liberal rhetoric refers to education as a tool for reform, 
the introduction of mass schooling, for example, has not in the 
vast majority of cases extended equal opportunities to working 
class children. Liberal reformism is a strategy for 
incorporation, where working class demands are acceded to in the 
modification of some unjust social conditions precisely in order 
to reduce demands for genuine change. Thus the prevailing power 
relations are strengthened,(22) The liberal rhetoric of gradual 
social change without conflict serves an essentially conservative 
and reactionary purpose, supporting the existing power 
structure.(23)
(vi) Education is for individual development
According to the liberal account, education promotes the personal
growth and fulfilment of the individual. This aspect of the
liberal philosophy receives particular emphasis in the work of 
John Dewey, for whom one of the functions of the school is the
development of the moral, cognitive and aesthetic potential of
the individual child.
But In spite of this emphasis, and because of the very nature of 
schooling in capitalist liberal democracies, education serves to 
alienate rather than develop the individual. Its function is to 
control her, and to prepare her for a place in the occupational 
hierarchy. What is more, this emphasis on the individual is 
symptomatic of further more deep-seated theoretical errors in the 
liberal view. It reinforces the notion of the individual as 
logically prior to society, assumed for example in IQ theories, 
which attribute properties like intelligence to individuals* in 
isolation from social structures.(24) And it emphasises a 
dangerous commitment to individualistic competitiveness, rather 
than social co-operation.(25)
(vii) liberal theory of education in South Africa
Taking its inspiration from revisionist historiography, the 
radical assessment of the state of theory of education in South 
Africa is highly critical of what it regards as the 'dominant 
liberal education tradition'.(26) This liberal tradition is 
characterised by a neglect of black education, a tendency to be 
descriptive and to lack critique, and a failure to see education 
in the context of South African society as a whole.(27) It is 
also argued that liberals have been mistaken in attributing 
oppression in South Africa to racial prejudice on the part of 
Afrikaners, rather than to capitalist development. Similarly, 
radical theorists stress that it is the needs of capital, rather 
than mere racial oppression, which provides an explanation for 
the establishment of Bantu Education. The essential pattern in
black education in South Africa, before and after 1948, has been 
to school blacks for semi- and unskilled jobs (except where 
manpower needs dictate otherwise) and the relations of production 
appropriate to such a dispensation. Persistent liberal 
assumptions about the nature and function of education continue 
to lie behind the view that education and extended educational 
facilities can act as a neutral agent for change in South 
Africa. Such a view is theoretically incapable of providing 
tools for understanding schools as sites of struggle, 
particularly since 1976.
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While my intention in the chapters which follow is to show that 
none of the features attributed to liberal theory of education in 
the arguments sketched above establishes the radical view that 
liberal theory of education is discredited, my position holds 
neither that radical theory of education has nothing to offer us, 
nor that none of the arguments above is correct, once detached 
from its mistaken association with liberalism. I must agree with 
the radicals that schooling cannot be seen as detached from 
political and economic features of a society, and that schooling 
on the whole fails to promote economic growth, equality or 
Individual development. And theories of ideology, though not 
without their own problems, have contributed enormously to our 
understanding of schooling. The radicals also point to some 
significant problems in the work of Hirst and Peters.
But to concede these arguments to the radicals is not to accept 
that they discredit liberal theory of education, because 
underlying these arguments is a characterisation of liberal 
theory, of society in general and of liberal theory of education, 
which is itself mistaken. The radical arguments must stand or 
fall on their characterisation of 1 liberal'. In showing that 
this characterisation is inadequate, Chapter 3 will argue that 
the liberal point of view is characterised by its central concern 
to defend the principle of individual freedom. This the radicals 
fail to acknowledge. While I will argue further that this 
defence of the principle of individual freedom takes different 
forms, depending on the particular context, and informed by 
various associated principles like that of equality, the argument 
about equality of opportunity attributed by the radicals to 
liberal theory of education is not necessary to a liberal view of 
education. Nor is a defence of capitalism.
Resting on my characterisation of he liberal point of view will 
be the argument in Chapter 3 that Hirst and Peters should not be 
seen as uncontroverslally representative of liberal philosophy of 
education, This will raise severe doubts about whether the 
problems attributed by the radicals to Hirst and Peters’s views 
are problems of liberal theory of education. I will argue that 
Hirst and Peters are in respect of their notion of education more 
appropriately described as conservative, and that P. S. Wilson 
and John White ought to have been included in radical discussions 
of liberal philosophy of education. And in the light of my 
characterisation of the liberal point of view I will show that
the central features of a liberal notion of education must be a 
concern to develop individual autonomy. I need hardly point out 
that the radical critics of liberal theory of education are 
sceptical towards the notion of autonomy. And although
'individualism1 is a feature of liberal education as recounted by 
the radicals» I will show in Chapter 7 that the radical 
characterisation of this notion in education is also inadequate. 
Similarly, Chapter 5 will question the radical attack on liberal 
theory of education in South Africa largely on the grounds of its 
characterisation of 'liberal't although other problems will also 
be exposed in the local radical position. To complete the 
picture: Chapters 8 and 9 are not direct responses to the
radical views which have been sketched in this chapter. By 
contrast with the depth and insights of the critique which
radical theorists have developed of schooling in capitalist 
societies* they have paid little attention to the task of 
offering a positive account of the notion of education. Chapters 
8 and 9 will compare liberal and radical notions of education. 
The similarities which will be revealed will draw further
attention to the simplistic nature of the radical 
characterisation of liberal theory of education.
In its challenging of the radical characterisation of the liberal 
point of view it is clear that this thesis is fundamentally about 
the use of the word 'liberal'. It sets out to show that, in the 
arguments attributed to liberal theory of education by the
radicals, this and other words are used carelessly, with a lack 
of sensitivity to their complexity. While radical theory offers
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strengths of the kinds acknowledged above, it would do well to 
look to the strengths of liberal philosophy of education in 
particular in order to overcome some of its conceptual weaknesses.
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CHAPTER 3 
THE LIBERAL POINT OF VIEW 
1
Whethese the radical critics are correct in holding that liberal 
theory of education is discredited depends crucially on the 
question of how the word 1 liberal1 is to be characterized. In 
this chapter I focus on the problem of characterizing the concept 
'liberal' by examining some aspects of the liberal tradition. In 
doing so I set out to illustrate some of the difficulties 
involved in giving an account of what the liberal point of view 
is. The essential point 1 wish to make is that characterizing 
what makes a view 'liberal' is not a simple matter* for reasons 1 
hope to make clear, My aim is to expose two mistakes* the first 
being that made in the radical arguments sketched in Chapter 2* 
which identify 'liberalism' with capitalism. The second is that 
made by those who identify 'liberalism' with specific examples of 
views expressed by spokesmen for the liberal point of view like 
John Locke or John Stuart Mill, whoso liberalism I will discuss 
in sections 2 and 3 respectively. In what follows I do not set 
out to give a comprehensive account of the rich and variable 
liberal tradition. Nor is it my aim in this chapter to develop a 
defensible version of the liberal point of view,
.idLrt _
In order to understand the nature of Locke's contribution to the 
liberal tradition we need to take note of the political and 
intellectual climate in late seventeenth century England. There 
were two dominant element* in this climate. First, the struggle 
for religious toleration and intellectual Freedom in the wake of 
the Reformation and Counter-Reformation, encouraged by the 
development of philosophy and science in the seventeenth 
century. And second, opposition to absolute monarchy, 
culminating in the Glorious Revolution of 1688.
Locke, who did not describe his ideas as liberal,(1) spoke for 
chose opposed to the Stuarts' attempt to extend their authority 
by raising a tax on property without the consent of Parliament, 
in violation of the Common Law tradition. This defence of Che 
right of the Individual to his property is a crucial aspect of 
Locke's argument. Significantly, his notion of property includes 
the idea of the individual's right to the fruits of his own 
labour; 'every man has property in his own person. This nobody 
has any right to but himself. The labour of his body and the 
work of his hands, wo may say, are properly his'.(2)
For Locke, according to the Law of Nature, all men have a natural 
right to life, liberty and property. The Law of Nature consists 
of a self-evident set of rules, which are rationally justified, 
and which all social beings must accept, Locke argued that 
reason is ' the common rule and measure God hath given to
mankind’.(3) Presupposed by such rational justification is a 
minimum level of impartiality and respect for the rights of 
others, and for their property. This emphasis on rational 
justification, on the model of demonstrating mathematical axioms, 
stands in contrast to the appeal to supernatural authority or 
tradition.
According to Lockn'a version of social contract theory, society 
had been established by free and equal individuals in a state of 
nature who, because of the insecurity of the state of nature, 
freely agreed to leave it and enter into civil society in order 
to better serve their rights. The individual men who consent to 
enter society give up the freedom, equality and independence 
which they had in the state of nature in exchange for the greater 
security of civil society, the main purpose of which is the 
preservation of its members' property. In a society established 
In this way, the legislature is the supreme power. For although 
men agreed to form a society for mutual advantage, nil eintee are 
potentially tyrannical. In this respect the main enemy is the 
executive, which must bo kept subject to the law and held in 
check by the legislature* loeko thus anticipates Montesquieu's 
elaboration of the theory of the separation of powers.
Sovereign coercive powers must in civil society be constrained by 
law:
The end of law is, not to abolish or restrain, but to 
preserve and enlarge freedom, For in all the states of 
created beings capable of laws, where there is no law there 
is no freedom. For liberty is to be free from restraint
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and violence from others? which cannot be where there is 
no law: and is not, as we are told, a liberty for every
man to do as he lists.(4)
Locke argued against Sir Robert Filmer's defence, in his
Patriarcha, of absolute royal authority, which was made on the 
grounds of an analogy with patriarchalism. Fllmer saw society 
as an extended family in which paternal authority is exercised In 
the hereditary right of kings to exercise the authority given to 
Adam over his children by God, In Filmer's opinion Adam's 
original authority as father of mankind is inherited by all 
kings, who are descendants of Adam, and who therefore carry the 
authority of nature and of God. thus kings exercise author-ty by 
divine right and are responsible in doing so only to God,
Locke's response is that while Adam had paternal authority over 
his children in their infancy, this ended once they reached
adulthood.
As was the case with his opposition to royal absolutism and 
attempts to justify it, Locke's defence of religious toleration 
was a response to the circumstances of the time in which he
wrote. At that time the churches, Lutheran, Oalvinist, Catholic 
and the Church of England, as well as secular ruloro saw it as 
their right and duty to force people to accept what the 
particular church or leader regarded as the true faith, In his 
'Letter on Toleration' freedom of religious belief is argued to 
be one of the chief liberties whoso preservation is the purpose 
of society and government, Locke argues that church and state 
are separate on the grounds that their functions are different.
And he argues for freedom for the individual in private spheres 
like religious belief;
... seeing one man does not violate the right of another, 
by his erroneous opinions, and undue manner of worship, nor 
is his perdition any prejudice to another man's affairs; 
therefore the care of each man's salvation belongs only to 
himself ... Anyone may employ as many exhortations and 
arguments as he pleases, towards the promoting of another 
man’s salvation. But all force and compulsion must be 
forborn. Nothing is to be done imperiously. Nobody is 
obliged in that manner to yield obedience unto the 
admonitions or Injunctions of another, farther than he 
himself is persuaded. Every man, in that, has the supreme 
and absolute authority of judging for himself; and the 
reason is, because nobody else is concerned in it, nor can 
receive any prejudice from hia conduct therein,(5)
Having sketched the essential features of lacke's arguments for 
liberty, I turn now to the question; what is it about Locke's 
ideas which leads us to describe them as an expression of the 
liberal point of view? And, if Locke’s arguments are part of the 
liberal tradition, what makes them so wuen, as 1 shall show, 
liberals writing at later stages in history are not concerned 
about religious toleration or royal absolutism, but with other 
issues? This problem points us in the right direction for 
developing an understanding of what characterizes the liberal 
point of view, 1 suggest that we must differentiate between the 
central principle or essential characteristic which distinguishes 
Locke's ideas as liberal, and his particular expression or 
specific application of the liboral point of view.(6) The 
central and most fundamental characteristic of liberal ideas is 
that they defend the principle of individual liberty or freedom, 
which I am going to treat as synonymous.(7) But of course an 
argument for liberty or freedom is not necessarily a statement of
the liberal point of view. For examplet one may call for freedom 
from exploitation or from colonial rule, without being a 
liberal. What distinguishes the liberal point of view is both 
that individual freedom is fundamental and the assumptions or 
associated principles which give meaning to this fundamental 
principle of individual liberty. Locke's argument in defence of 
the principle of liberty rests on the following assumptions or 
principles: that individuals are autonomous agents capable of
conducting their affairs rationally, and that individual rights 
and tolerance are of central importance. These assumptions and 
the central characteristic must be distinguished from the 
particular expressions of the liberal point of view, for example 
Locke's defence of religious liberty, or of the right to 
property. My argument is that the particular expressions of the 
liberal point of view change according to historical
circumstances, while the central characteristic remains constant 
as fundamental and definitive, although the assumptions and 
principles which give meaning to the principle of individual 
liberty are not entirely static and unshifting.
On the basis of this distinction between the central
characterleing elements of a statement of the liberal point of 
view on the one hand and its particular expressions on the other* 
we can gain a proper perspective on 0, W. Macpherson's
controversial but notable analysis of Locke's ideas, 
Macpherson's Marxist interpretation is that the theoretical 
underpinning of Locke's work, and of subsequent liberal 
democratic theory, is possessive individualism, Locke's theory
of property 'provides a moral foundation for bourgeois 
appropriation ... the whole theory of property is a justification 
of the natural right not only to unequal property but to
unlimited individual appropriation1.(8) Locke 'justifiest os 
natural, a class differential in rights and in rationality, and 
by doing so provides a positive moral basis for capitalist 
society1,(9)
While MacpLarson may well be right in his criticism that Locke's
social theory can be seen to underpin these social
consequences,(10) we should not make the mistake of extending
Macpherson's insights so as to see them as identifying the 
essential characteristics of the liberal point of view. 
Macpherson's work should be seen as concerned with critical 
evaluation of the content of Locke's particular expression of the 
liberal point of view. The relationship between particular 
instances of the liberal point of view and criteria for this 
point of view is aptly described by D, J. Manning;
What we can soy is that Locke's political theory is one of 
the faces that liberalism can pull, and occasionally does. 
It is compatible with its bone structure. But is is not an 
appearance that liberalism has always presented or must 
again present to retain its identity. The identity of 
liberalism is to be found in the limits of its 
transfigurations, not in the persistence of a collection of 
individual expressions,(11)
My distinction between the central characteristic and the 
particular expressions of the liberal point of view can be 
developed further by closer examination of Manning's metaphor. 
The faces that 'liberalism' can pull are analogous to the varying
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particular expressions of the liberal point of view. The bone 
structure is comparable with the more constant central 
characteristic and associated assumptions and principles of the 
liberal point of view. But we can also note that the bone 
structure of the face does not remain rigid. It too changes and 
grows.
In examining further examples from the liberal tradition we 
encounter other faces which it pulls. The discussion of these 
below will illustrate my argument that the tradition is 
characterized by its central tieristic, defence of
individual freedom, and that it has no single spokesman.
3
The liberal point of view as expressed by John Stuart Mill is a 
reflection of the changed circumstances in England by the 
nineteenth century. Although, like Locke % Mill was concerned to 
defend intellectual liberty, the threat of religious persecution 
and absolute monarchy had by this time been checked. Mill 
addressed himself to new threats to liberty From, as he saw it, 
the potential tyranny of the majority posed by the development of 
popular government, and the growing powers of the bureaucracy.
In his essay On Liberty Mill states that his objective is to 
assert the principle
that the sole end for which, mankind are warranted, 
individually or collectively, in interfering with the
particular expressions of the liberal point of view. The bone 
structure is comparable with the more constant central 
characteristic and associated assumptions and principles of the 
liberal point of view. But we can also note that the bone 
structure of the face does not remain rigid, It too changes and 
grows.
In examining further examples from the liberal tradition we 
encounter other faces which it pulls. The discussion of these 
below will illustrate my argument that the tradition is 
characterized by its central characteristic, defence of 
individual freedom, and that it has no single spokesman.
3
The liberal point of view as expressed by John Stuart Mill is a 
reflection of the changed circumstances in England by the 
nineteenth century, Although, like Locke, Mill was concerned to 
defend Intellectual liberty, the threat of religious persecution 
and absolute monarchy had by this time been checked. Mill 
addressed himself to new threats to liberty from, as he saw 
the potential tyranny of the majority posed by the development of 
popular government, and the growing powers of the bureaucracy.
In his essay On Liberty Mill states that his objective is to
assert the principle
that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, 
individually or collectively, in interfering with the
liberty of action of any of their number, is 
self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can 
be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized 
community, against his will, is to prevent harm to 
others... The only part of the conduct of any one, for 
which he is amenable bo society, is that which concerns 
others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his 
independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, his own 
body and mind, the individual is sovereign,(12)
Thus Mill makes a crucial distinction between an area of the 
individual1s life which is essentially private and should be free 
of interference from others, and the public sphere, where the 
interests of others are involved and where coercion may be 
justified. In a free society three spheres of individual liberty 
will be respected. Freedom, argues Mill,
comprises, first, the inward domain of consciousness, 
demanding liberty of conscience in the most comprehensive 
sense; liberty of thought and feeling, absolute freedom of 
opinion and sentiment on all subjects, practical or 
speculative, scientific, moral, or theological. The 
liberty of expressing and publishing opinions... Secondly, 
the principle requires liberty of tastes and pursuits, of 
framing the plan of our life to suit our own character; of 
doing as we like, subject to such consequences as may 
follow: without impediment from our fellow-creatures, so
long as what we do does not harm them, even though they 
should think our conduct foolish, perverse, or wrong. 
Thirdly, from this liberty of each individual, follows the 
liberty, within the same limits, of combination among 
individuals; freedom to unite for any purpose not 
involving harm to others: the persons combining being
supposed to be of full ago and not forced or deceived.(13)
These introductory considerations in On Liberty are followed by 
the development of two related themes, The first is a defence of 
freedom of thought and discussion, and the second an argument for 
the ideal of individuality. In arguing for freedom of thought 
and discussion, Mill passionately defends freedom of opinion:
If all mankind minus one were of one opinion, and only one 
person were of fche contrary opinion, mankind would be no 
more justified in silencing that one person than he, if he 
had the power, would be justified in silencing mankind.(14)
Mill defends not only the right of the individual to his own 
opinions, but also the view that to allow a diversity of opinions 
is to promote the search for truth.
The second major theme of On Liberty, the argument for the ideal 
of individuality, rests on Mill's admiration for the type of 
individual who is energetic, spontaneous and original, intent on 
developing his potential to the highest degree. Such a person 
could escape from the unthinking conformity of the masses and has 
the ability to exercise choice autonomously. Mill saw human 
nature 'not as a machine to be built after a model and set to do 
exactly the work prescribed for it, bub a tree which requires to 
grow and develop itself on all sides according to the tendency of 
the inward forces which make it a living thing'.(15) Modifying 
the utilitarianism of Jeremy Ben them and James Mill, he gave to 
the principle of utility a qualitative interpretation, arguing 
that certain kinds of pleasure, those based on 'the higher 
faculties of man', are more desirable than others.(16) The type 
of individual which Mill had in mind would freely exercise his 
higher faculties as parts of happiness* rather than merely as 
means to happiness, For Mill 'individuality is the same thing 
with development, and... it is only the cultivation of 
individuality which produces, or can produce, well-developed 
human beings'.(17)
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Such individuality is not only of worth to the Individual „ 1 In
proportion to the development of his individuality, each person 
becomes more valuable to himself, and is therefore capable of 
being more valuable to others.'(18) Mill posits the idea of an 
elite of individuals whose originality would enable them to 
discover new truths and to experiment, with the possibility of 
improving on accepted practices, to the benefit of a,l. Such 
individuals are described as 'the salt of the earth, without them 
human life would become a stagnant pool',(19)
Although Mill shares with Locke the defence of intellectual 
freedom and individual autonomy, their reasons for defending 
these principles were not the same. While Locke's defence of 
liberty was baaed on his theory of Natural Law and of one's 
natural right to liberty, for Mill the individual's right to 
liberty was founded on the principle of utility, although he did 
not adhere consistently to utilitarianism. This is partly 
explained by the immediate background to Mill's presentation of 
his defence of liberty. While the intellectual climate at the 
time of Locke was one of scepticism, Mill's ideas were 
influenced, although he departed from them to a considerable 
degree, by the philosophical radicalism of Bentham and James 
Mill, who rejected both the natural law tradition and social 
contract theory, Instead, the dominant features of their 
writings were utilitarianism and the materialism of the pleasure 
principle.
Mill's position as a prominent member of the liberal tradition is
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not only underpinned by different influences from other 
defendants of liberty. He also embraces issues which were not 
concerns of others like Locke. He was a champion of women's 
rights, arguing, controversially in the eyes of many later 
critics, that 'nothing more is needed for the complete removal of 
the evil [of the almost despotic power of husbands over wives3 
than that wives should have the same rights, and should receive 
the protection of the law in the same manner, as all other 
persons'.(20) He favoured the extension of the vote to women and 
the working classes. However, he expressed scepticism about the 
prospects for society of the growth of popular government, and so 
supported the extension of the suffrage with certain 
qualifications* for example that access to the franchise should 
be denied to those receiving parish relief* to bankrupts, to 
those who persistently fail to pay their taxes, end to the 
illiterate. As Locke had opposed absolute monarchy, Mill saw the 
claims to absolute sovereignty on behalf of the common man as an 
equally dangerous threat to individual liberty. He suggested 
that the effect of universal suffrage would be 'to make one 
narrow mean type of human nature universal and perpetual, and to 
crush every influence which tends to the further improvement of 
man's intellectual and moral nature'.(21) While ho believed chat 
most adult members of society should have the voto, he argued for 
provision to ensure that reason and education should have a 
stronger influence, by defending the idea that the more educated 
members of society should have more than one voto, Mill argued 
in favour of representative government, in the hands of the 
middle class, whom he regarded as the most energetic and able at
I-' . -  ■> ■'SSfealS,. . .
that time; the aristocracy he considered to have 'fallen off in 
energy and intellect and strength of will'.(22)
Mill's argument on representative government is clearly a 
controversial one. It has been criticised as a defence of middle 
class interests. This may well be an appropriate criticism, but 
its validity does not concern me here. The crucial significance 
of this feature of Mill's work is that it loads us back to my 
argument that the liberal point of view is to be characterised by 
its central principle as opposed to specific applications of that 
principle. Mill's writings, including his ideas on 
representative government, are, like Locke's, a defence of the 
principle of liberty of the individual. In defending this 
fundamental principle, which is the necessary feature of all 
expressions of the liberal point of view, Mill appeals to a set 
of principles and assumptions such as individuality and the 
privacy of the individual in matters which concern only himself, 
freedom of opinion, the rights of women and minorities, the role 
of law in establishing and protecting such rights, and belief in 
the role of education and reason in directing human affairs* 
However, Mill's views on representative government aro an example 
of the varying expressions of which the liberal point of view is 
capable. They aro not essential to all expressions of the 
liberal point of view; clearly the common liberal view on the 
franchise today is that it should bo extended to all adult 
citizens, possibly with a few exceptions, but these are unlikely 
to resemble thOwe suggested by Mill.
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For these reasons I am not much impressed by the move made by 
critics of liberalism and liberal theory of education to tar the 
liberal point of view with the capitalist brush. One of the 
manifestations of this crude understanding of the liberal 
tradition is the attempt to dismiss Mill's ideas, and the liberal 
point of view in general, as centrally a defence of capitalism, 
through Mill's association with the classical economists of 
eighteenth and nineteenth century England. I will consider this 
issue briefly*
The doctrine of classical economics subscribed to by Adam Smith, 
Thomas Maithus, Jeremy Bentuam, David Ricardo, the two Mills and 
others must be understood historically as a reaction against 
mercantilism. Mercantilist policy was aimed at fostering 
domestic trade and industry, directing private enterprise to the 
public advantage and securing a favourable balance of trade* In 
rejecting mercantilism, the classical economists argued that 
economic freedom would maximise wealth. The collective wealth 
would be increased by allowing each individual to pursue bis own 
interests. Government cannot, and should not try to, produce 
economic growth by intervention* Competition, the division of 
labour and the accumulation of capital were regarded as essential 
to growth*
It is all too easy to lose perspective on this association 
between classical economics, the liberal point of view, and 
nineteenth century capitalism. The association may exist in a 
certain form in the case of Mill, but there are some
qualifications of which wa ought to take note. First* Mill 
rejected Bentham's view that people are always motivated by 
self-interest.(23) A central assumption of the capitalist 
position is that if all Individuals are left free to pursue their 
own interest, the result will be the benefit of all. Secondly, 
Mill was sympathetic towards certain brands of socialism.(24) 
Thirdly, ha suggested a number of possible exceptions to the 
principle of laiasez-fairo, for example government action to 
provide better education for more people, and the protection of 
children from exploitation in the work place. Ho wrote in his 
Autobiography:
The social problem of the future we considered to be, how 
to unite the greatest individual liberty of action, with a 
common ownership in the raw materials of the globe, and an 
equal participation of all in the benefits of combined 
labour,.. [Employers and the labouring masses] must l e a m  
by practice to labour and combine for generous, or at all 
events for public and social purposes, and not, as 
hitherto, solely for narrowly interested ones.(25)
Mill's economic theory and his opinions in general should not be 
seen as essentially a defence of capitalism. While many people 
in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries who have regarded 
themselves os liberal may have favoured capitalism, this does not 
establish that support for capitalism is on essential feature of 
the liberal point of view. The liberal point of view is only 
contingently, not logically connected with capitalism. What was 
essential to Mill's expression of the liberal point of view was 
fundamentally its defence of the principle of individual liberty, 
developed through the assumptions and principles listed above, 
Mill's more controversial ideas are evidence not that the liberal
point of view is 1 wrong' but that it is capable of generating 
variable expressions. At this level of variable expression the 
liberal point of view is compatible with a variety of substantive 
policies particular to particular historical conditions, as I 
have shown in the cases of Locke and Mill. And as with Locke, to 
designate Mill as a spokesman for the liberal point of view whose 
content is viewed ahistorically as constant and unvarying is 
simplistic. Each expressed the liberal concerns of his ago.
N}y observation on the contingent relationship between the 
liberal point of view and capitalism, or any other particular 
content* is borne out by a glance at the development of the 
liberal tradition after Che period of 'classical' liberal ideas 
associated with Mill.(26) Liberal concerns subsequent to Mill 
become more and more centred on economic issues, and social 
problems generated by industrialisation,
There can be observed in m o d e m  expressions of the liberal point 
of view a variety ot strands of liberalism. F. A. Hoyok, for 
example, defends the competitive economy and economic 
individualism against what ho perceives as the threat posed to 
individual freedom by central planning and collectivism,(27) 
Milton Friodman arguos that capitalism preserves freedom.(28)
Karl Popper defends the notion of the 'open society' against 
brands of 'utopianism' like Marxism.(29) L, T, Hothouse, on the 
other hand, argues that the state must accept responsibility for 
tho welfare of its citizens, Hothouse observes a change in
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direction in liberal thinking, arguing that
men of the keenest liberal sympathies have come not merely 
to accept but eagerly to advance the extension of public 
control in the industrial sphere, and of collective 
responsibility in the matter of the education and even the 
feeding of children, the housing of the industrial 
population, the care of the sick and aged, the provision of 
the means of regular employment,(30)
4
That the liberal point of view is capable of generating such 
variable substantive policies supports my argument that it is its 
central concern for the principle of individual freedom which 
distinguishes it from other points of view. While the content 
may vary, it is this central principle which gives unity to the 
liberal tradition. To fail to recognise this loads radical 
critics to make the mistake of identifying 'liberalism* with 
'capitalism', or of treating the ideas of locke or Mill as 
timeless statements of the liberal point of view, abstracted from 
the circumstances in which they wore located. Such a lack of 
historical perspective is surprising, coming from those who claim 
to express the Marxist point of view.
This chapter can now bo concluded by locating its main argument 
in my argument as a whole. Reflecting firstly on its 
significance for the Issues set up in the previous chapter, I 
have suggested that the radical critics are wrong to assume a 
necessary association between liberalism and capitalism, I will 
show later that just as liberal social theory is contingently 
related to capitalism, capitalist assumptions are not an
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indispensable feature of liberal theory of education. Indeed,
they may well be a threat to it.
Secondly, looking ahead now to the chapters which follow, I am 
going to show, in Chapters 4 and 5 respectively, that the radical 
attack on liberal philosophy of education and liberal studies of 
education in South Africa does not establish a ease against 
liberal theory of education, centrally because the radical view 
of what is 'liberal1 is mistaken, in ways which I will 
demonstrate. While Chapter 6 will show that P. S. Wilson and 
John White do reflect, in their notion of education, the central 
liberal concern with individual freedom, they are not considered 
in radical attacks on liberal philosophy of education. In 
Chapter t, ~ 11 develop a formal account of what is implied by
the conce* i freedom in a liberal notion of education, while 
Chapter 7 ' -and a notion of liberal individualism which is
different to the individualism attributed by radicals to 
'liberal1 theory of education.
In defending those arguments I will continue to contest the 
radical use of the word 'liberal'. In doing so it is necessary 
to distinguish throe different senses in which the notion of 
'liberalism' will be referred to from now on. Firstly, there is 
the mistaken radical reference to 'liberalism'. Secondly, the 
word 'liberal' can bo used in the way defended in this chapter, 
in the context of referring to the broad liberal tradition, with 
its variety of expressions which share a common concern to defend 
individual freedom. There is also a third sense whose use will
indispensable feature of liberal theory of education. Indeed,
they may well be a threat to it.
Secondly, looking ahead now to the chapters which follow, I am 
going to show, in Chapters 4 and 5 respectively, that the radical 
attack on liberal philosophy of education and liberal studies of 
education in South Africa does not establish a case against 
liberal theory of education, centrally because the radical view 
of what is 'liberal1 is mistaken, in ways which I will 
demonstrate. While Chapter 6 will show that P. S. Wilson and 
John White do reflect, in their notion of education, the central 
liberal concern with individual freedom, they are not considered 
in radical attacks on liberal philosophy of education. In 
Chapter 6 I will develop a formal account of what is implied by 
the concern for freedom in a liberal notion of education, while 
Chapter 7 will defend a notion of liberal individualism which is 
different to the individualism attributed by radicals to 
'liberal* theory of education.
In defending these arguments I will continue to contest the 
radical use of the word 'liberal1. In doing so it is necessary 
to distinguish three different senses in which the notion of 
'liberalism' will be referred to from now on. Firstly, there is 
the mistaken radical reference to 'liberalism'. Secondly, the 
word 'liberal' can be used in the way defended in this chapter, 
in the context of referring to the broad liberal tradition, with 
its variety of expressions which share a common concern to defend 
individual freedom. There is also a third sense whose use will
become more important as I proceed in Chapters 6 and 7 to defend 
a liberal notion of education. I will use this third sense of 
1 liberal1 when arguing for a defensible liberal position. It is 
necessary to introduce this third sense in view of the diversity 
of expressions which there may be of the liberal perspective on a 
certain issue at a particular time. Because the meaning of 
liberalism is, beyond its central principle, dependent on 
historical circumstances, we cannot expect it to offer recipes 
for exactly what is an important issue and how to deal with it. 
It is, for example, possible for a liberal to disagree with 
Milton Friedman's defence of capitalism as the best means of 
defending individual freedom, on the grounds of an argument which 
we will encounter later, to the effect that Friedman is wrong in 
holding the view that capitalism can protect the freedom of all, 
rather than of the few.
Having distinguished between three sense.# in which the word 
1 liberal1 will be used from now on, we turn from the task of 
characterising liberal social theory to the more specific context 
of theory of education, beginning with the radical arguments 
against Hirst and Peters as 1 liberal1 philosophers of education.
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P. H, HIRST A 1  R, S. PETERS LIBERAL PHILOSOPHERS OF
In Chapter 2 I Indicated that part of the radical attack on 
1liberaV theory of education is directed against the work of 
Hirst and Beters, who are criticized for their views of knowledge 
and education, and of the nature of theory of education. As the 
first of the two examples of radical arguments against 1liberal1 
theory of education which I propose to examine in detail, I will 
assess in this chapter the radical critique of the work of Hirst 
and Peters. The ideas I am going to examine are those expressed 
mainly by Michael Matthews, Kevin Harris, and also by Madan 
Sarup,(l) who share a rejection of the kind of philosophy of 
education exemplified in the work of Hirst and Peters, which all 
three associate with liberalism. Sarup describes Hirst and 
Peters as 1 the liberal philosophers',(2) while Harris associates 
Hirst and Peters with liberal ideas by treating their work as 
1liberal rhetoric' and Peters as an apologist for 'the liberal 
tradition1.(3) Matthews, who offers the most systematic critical 
treatment of Hirst and Peters, describes the ana]vtie philosophy 
of education of which he regards Hirst and Peters as the chief
/(A.
proponents, as 'the educational representative of a 
liberal-rationalist world view'.(4)
In examining the criticisms which are made of Hirst and Peters 
from a radical standpoint, I am centrally Interested in the 
extent to which these criticisms succeed in establishing the
alleged poverty of liberal ideas in philosophy of education, as 
part of a general attack on the place of liberal ideas in theory 
of education. I am going to argue that, far from establishing 
such a conclusion, the radical critics of Hirst and Peters make 
two fundamental errors« Firstly, they mistakenly take Hirst and 
Peters to be uncontroveraially representative of analytic
philosophy of education, which in turn is treated as 
unambiguously 'liberal'. And secondly, apparently assuming the 
meaning of 'liberal' to be either irrelevant or unproblematic, 
they treat the ideas of Hirst and Peters as representing an 
uncontroveraially liberal position, Here I will show that in 
certain crucial respects it would be more appropriate to describe 
Hirst and Peter* as conservative, which* ambiguously, the radical 
critics do at times. In discussing those issues it is not my
intention to undertake either a defence of the ideas of Hirst and 
Peters, or a comprehensive critical treatment of their work and 
its significance, My concern is with the issue of whether a
successful case has boon made for the view that liberal ideas 
should be dismissed as discredited and of no further use in 
theory of education, with special reference to philosophy of 
education,
Radical criticisms of Hirst and Rotors, as analytic philosophers 
of education, or 'ARBs', as Matthews calls them* adopting Jim 
Waller's acronym, focus on throe aspects of their work. In 
Matthews's treatment those are Lhoir philosophical method, their 
opistomology end their concept of schooling and education. Each 
of those aspects in turn contributes to the overall judgement 
that the work of Hirst and Peters is fundamentally a defence of 
tho statue quo. I will deal with the criticisms of each of those 
aspects in turn, and then proceed to a consideration of the 
rejection of their work a& defending the status ouo«
Concerning the issue of philosophical method, Matthow@(5) is 
critical, firstly* of analytic philosophy of education's 
commitment to conceptual analysis as tho correct method, Ho 
alleges that analysis as a method in philosophy has keen 
discredited and that its tide has ebbed. The first reason for 
this, ho suggests, is that the quality of the practitioners has 
deteriorated since Austin. The second is that* according to 
Matthews, Popper's view that science and philosophy should bo 
concerned with searching for truth rather than for meanings, is 
gaining wider acceptance. While there is a legitimate place for
analysing concepts wit 'n particular theories* analysis alone is
0
rejected by Matthews,
One could quarrel here with Matthews's superficial and summary 
treatment of analytic philosophy*(6) but although I will indicate
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the inadequacies in the radical characterization of linguistic 
philosophy offered by Matthews, this is not my primary interest. 
Generally, however, Matthews might have characterized what he 
calls 'analytical philosophy' more adequately if he had chosen to 
use the term 'linguistic philosophy', thus focussing on its 
concern with analysing the structures and properties of lanKuaKe 
as a way of coming to understand the world.(7) Nevertheless 1 
will use with reservation (it is possible for a philosopher to 
use analytic methods without being part of the 'school' of 
linguistic philosophy) the term 'analytic philosophy' in my 
account and assessment of the radical criticisms in question. 
But my enterprise is concerned primarily with whether there is a 
case for defending the relevance of liberal ideas in philosophy 
of education. And the crucial point hero is that Matthews's 
rejection of analysis as a philosophical method does nothing to 
establish a case against liberalism, for it is clear both that 
liberal ideas predate the emergence of analysis as a  method, and 
that a commitment to analysis is not at the same time a 
commitment to liberal ideas. A similar observation can be made 
of Sarup's objection that, operating within the Anglo-American 
tradition of philosophy, the 'liberal philosophers' ignore the 
insights offered by the phenomenological and Marxian traditions. 
While analytic philosophy of education may have tended to be 
provincial in this respect, the point I wish to make in response 
to this observation is that this tendency is certainly not a 
necessary feature of a liberal position.
Matthews's second criticism of the method of analytic philosophy
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of education Is that the distinction between science and
philosophy has been discredited. He refers as examples to 
Peters's distinction between scientific and philosophical 
questions, as involving different kinds of procedures>t or as 
involving first-order and second-order activities respectively, 
and to what he describes as Hirst's endorsement of such
separatism in describing science and philosophy as different 
forms of knowledge, For Matthews the distinction between 
concepts and the phenomena to which they are applied cannot be 
maintained, 'The row materials of scientific production are
already theorized materials, they are not real objects; when
they are worked over into theoretical products they can be raw 
materials for another production process,'(8) Again, while there 
may be interesting issuoa which could be taken up here,(9) in the 
context of this discussion I will simply point out that Matthews 
has not demonstrated that the kinds of distinction in question 
are necessary features of a liberal position.
Matthews's third criticism of the method of analytic philosophy 
of education is one which ho shares with Harris, both attacking 
the claim that analytic philosophy of education, by concerning 
itself with second-order questions* is ethically and politically 
neutral. Hirst and Peters are criticised for describing 
philosophy as concerned with second-order as against first-order 
questions, claiming to pursue elm analysis of concepts and d m  
grounds for and presuppositions of various forms of discourse as 
detached and neutral spectators, whose role is not to pronounce 
on issuoa of policy.
Pointing to the impossibility of such defaehedness 'in both 
theory and practice', Matthews argues that the ideological 
content of ordinary language has clear implications for
second-order analysis:
... if the first-order discourse embodies political 
choices* class interests and ethical prejudices* then the 
role of the philosopher aa portrayed by Peters cements 
these. Far from being neutral, philosophy on the APE model 
is guaranteed to be political, at least to the extent that 
the first-order discourses are not value-free.,. Analysis 
takes language, everyday theory and common sense as given 
and fails to comprehend the ensemble as a product of 
certain practices which are historically contingent* and 
politically and economically ordered.(10)
Harris sees the detached analysis claimed for this sooond-order 
nativity as 'a fiction'. He suggests that* contrary to the 
claims made on behalf of this second-order activity*
The end product* however, was to determine practical 
policy; the practical policy of leaving everything as it 
is, This was achieved negatively by not prescribing policy 
issues: and positively through the ideological
jushificatory-doseription of certain policy issues already 
in practice. Hirst and Peters* for instance, managed to 
"justify" in their collected works virtually every aspect 
of the social and educational status ouo that might serve 
the interests of those wishing to preserve the status quo, 
and to present those justifications as rational, logical 
and disinterested. The end result was to serve and satisfy 
not only a large number of people at the decision-making 
level* but also to fulfil a necessary general ideological 
function of producing "interest-free" justifications for 
the continuance of social practices which actually servo 
particular W i t i c a l  interests,(11)
There are hero again issues which are not part of my 
undertaking.(12) Keeping this in mind I have two issues to 
raise. Firstly, although doubts about the second-order and 
neutral nature of Hirst and Peters's work are well-founded,(13)
this is neither a claim made universally by 'APEs' on behalf of 
their work, nor does it necessarily have anything to do with the 
alleged liberal nature of Hirst and Peters's analyses. Secondly, 
and more importantly, there is the question of the identification 
of the interests which Hirst and Peters, in spite of their claims 
to detachodnesa and neutrality, are alleged to express or serve. 
Both Harris(14) and Matthews(15) suggest* specifically of Peters, 
that hero we have the ideas of the ruling class, Harris also* as 
quoted above* sees the work ot Hirst and Peters as serving the 
status quo. Criticising, with justification, the use of the 
metaphor of the State as umpire by Peters and Stanley Bonn* 
Matthews suggests that they 'provide a clear instance of just 
such supposedly neutral analysis disguising substantive 
judgements of a conservative kind'*(my ompha8is)(16)
The problem which emerges hero is the apparent identification of 
'ruling class'* 'status quo', and 'conservative', with the 
liberalism which the radical critics attribute to Hirst and 
Peters, This issue I will take up later. What I have pointed to 
so far, in considering the objections by the radical critics to 
the method of analytic philosophy of education* is that their 
criticisms do not ostabtish a case against liberal philosophy of 
education.
Moving on to the issue of the epistemology of analytic philosophy 
of education, wo note that Matthews declares that 'Paul Hirst's 
"Forms of Knowledge" thesis is the epistemology of APE',(17) 
Radical critics reject the forms of knowledge thesis and its
implications for education, curricula decisions and teacher-pupj1 
relationships. The critics muster a number of arguments in their 
attack on Hirst's claim that there are seven forms of knowledge, 
distinguishable in terms of specific concepts, logical structure, 
distinctive tiuth tests, and distinctive methodologies for 
formulating truth claims, These arguments are familiar and I 
will not dwell on them at length.
Matthews 8uggosta(18) that there is some equivocation and 
ambiguity in Hirst's formulation of the criteria for and the 
classes named as forma of knowledge, and also that Hirst uses the 
term 'forms of knowledge' in both a structural and a 
prepositional sense.(19) Further, Hirst underestimates the 
difficulties which arise from his attempt to attribute 
distinctive concepts, logical structure, tests of truth and 
procedures to the seven forms of knowledge* Hirst's position is 
seen as evidence of a belief that knowledge is objective(20) and, 
for Sarup, absolute,(21) rather than socially and culturally 
situated. It also indicates a tendency to regard only 
prepositional knowledge as knowledge,(22) and to see the abstract 
and theoretical as superior to practical knowledge.(23)
That moat arguments of this kind have some cogoncy is widely 
accepted, although [ question Sarup's claim, in summarising 
Michael Young's thesis in Knowledge and Control, that Hirst and 
Peters, by failing bo acknowledge the socio-hiatorical context in 
which knowledge is constructed, commit themselves to an 
'absolute' conception of knowledge, As Matthews emphasizes,
Hirst himself has modified his own position since the early 
formulation of the thesis. But it is striking that criticisms of 
the forms of knowledge thesis are by no means the monopoly of 
radical critics. John Watt, identified as an 'ABE' by Matthews, 
raises problems about the number of forms of knowledge proposed 
by Hirst and about the way in which the various forms are 
distinguished from one another.(24) Richard Bring, another 'APE' 
named by Matthews, makes more radical criticisms of the forms of 
knowledge thesis.(25) Bring objects to what he sees as Hirst's 
over-emphasis on the cognitive component of 'knowledge1, which 
neglects practical knowledge and concentrates on prepositional 
knowledge. He also objects to the reductionism involved in 
proposing seven fundamental forms of knowledge and suggests that 
Hirst's characterization of the forms is confused. Yet another 
'ABE', John White, argues(26) that there are difficulties of 
formulation, justification and completeness in the forms of 
knowledge thesis (although he acknowledges an indebtedness to 
it). While Matthews may be right in asserting that much of this 
criticism is 'intraparadigm discussion* or 'normal science', it 
does raise a question about the accuracy of his sweeping claim 
that the forms of knowledge thesis is the epistemology of 
analytic philosophy of education.
One does not, then, need a radical analysis to see the problems 
in the forms of knowledge thesis as an epistemological position. 
Nor, in the light of the criticism of the thesis from within 
analytic philosophy of education, ought w§ to view Hirst, or 
Peters, as representing, in any simple or straightforward way,
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the work of other analytic philosophers of education. In any 
case, to revert to my main interest in this discussion, the 
crucial point is that Hirst's forms of knowledge thesis should 
not be identified as the epistemology of a liberal philosophy of 
education. It has not been demonstrated that the thesis is 
necessary to a liberal position in philosophy of education.
I shall now turn to the question of Hirst and Peters's concept of 
schooling and education. Hirst's forms of knowledge thesis is 
criticised by his radical opponents, both as an epistemology and 
for its role in his exegesis and defence of 'liberal education'. 
Attempting to develop a positive notion of liberal education, 
Hirst takes as his starting point the idea 'of an education based 
fairly and squarely on the nature of knowledge itself.(27) This 
very starting point, together with the view which he implicitly 
shares with Peters that education is initiation into public 
traditions and modes of understanding, which can be identified in 
terms of the forms of knowledge, is rejected by the radical 
critics. Although Hirst does not use the word 'initiation1 in 
his account of the forms of knowledge, Sarup is correct in 
attributing a notion of initiation to Hirst's view of education. 
Also rejected is Hirst's view that liberal education derives 
objectivity from the knowledge pointed with these public modes 
of understanding.(28) By incv U'ating his mistaken epistemology 
into his notion of education, and by defending a curriculum based 
on these forms of knowledge, Hirst, according to the radicals, 
legitimates the assumption that the traditional middle class 
subjects of the grammar school represent 'knowledge'. By
favouring prepositional, abstract and theoretical knowledge over 
practical knowledge,(29) Hirst's liberal education serves to 
perpetuate the distinction between mental and manual labour. His 
absolute view of knowledge and education presumes that the 
knowledge and theorising of the teacher is superior to that of 
the pupil.(30) In initiating her into the public traditions and 
modes of understanding it imposes on her a particular 
construction of meaning, to the exclusion of others. Let us 
examine Hirst's own explanation of his view of 'liberal 
education' in order to see whether these charges stick, and, to 
the extent that they might, what their significance is for the 
present discussion.
In developing his positive notion of 'liberal education' Hirst 
turns to the Greek notion of liberal education 'as a process 
concerned simply and directly with the pursuit of 
knowledge'.(31) Various doctrines about the mind, knowledge and 
the good life in ancient Greece give 'particular meaning and 
significance' to this general idea. In terms of these doctrines 
the distinguishing activity of the mind is to pursue knowledge, 
the achievement of which enables the mind to attain its 
appropriate end, the pursuit of knowledge being an element of the 
good life. Through reason, the mind comes to know ultimate 
reality. This knowledge develops into a structured scheme, which 
determines the structure and content of education, the 
justification of which is the development of the mind, not some 
use to which it may be put.
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Although he refines somewhat the original Greek formulation, 
Hirst reasserts the Greek idea that 'A liberal education is, 
then, one that, determined in scope and content by knowledge 
itself, is thereby concerned with the development of mind'.(32) 
This idea of an education that aims 'at the cultivation and 
development of the mind in the full range of man's understanding' 
is preferred to one based on 'the predilections of pupils, the 
demands of society, or the whims of politicians1.(33)
While maintaining the general Greek formulation. Hirst argues 
that 'adequate definition and justification are not only not 
dependent on the classical, doctrines, but can in fact be based 
directly on an explication of the concepts of "mind" and 
"knowledge" and by their relationships'.(34) But while Hirst 
claims to articulate a more contemporary version of the notion of 
liberal education, 'no longer supported by epistemological nnd 
metaphysical doctrines that result in a hierarchical organization 
of the various forms of knowledge',(35) he retains a feature of 
the Greek version which justifies one attack on his theory by the 
radicals. This attack highlights the problem of favouring 
propositions! over practical knowledge, and so sanctioning the 
distinction between mental and manual labour. In discussing the 
planning and conduct of 'liberal education' Hirst remarks 
parenthetically, 'Certainly liberal education as is here being 
understood is only one part of the education a person ought to 
have, for it omits quite deliberately for instance a specialist 
education, physical education and character training'.(36)
What are the implications of this omission? Firstly, it seems 
that here we do have the suggestion that 'other' aspects of
education, those supposedly not involved in the development of
mind by means of initiation into the forms of knowledge, are not,
centrally, 'education'. This supports the criticism that Hirst's 
'liberal education', favouring propositional over practical 
knowledge, contributes to the perpetuation of the distinction 
between mental and manual labour. Secondly, Hirst's omission 
does provide us with evidence for saying that the traditional 
subjects or disciplines of middle class schooling are the model 
for Hirst's formulation of his notion of liberal education.(37) 
But thirdly, as for the allegation that Hirst's view assumes that 
'the teacher's knowledge and theorising' is superior to that of 
the pupil, and imposes on her a particular construction of 
meaning, to the exclusion of others, the position is less clear. 
There is something odd about the idea of 'the teacher's 
knowledge', as if knowledge is a commodity which can be possessed 
by some individuals» There is the further problem that, as I
will show in Chapter 9, the radicals do not succeed in their 
account of education, where they offer one, in avoiding the 
dangers of Imposing a particular view on the learner.
But returning to the main issue in this discussion, what are the 
implications, for the viability or otherwise of a liberal notion 
of education, of Hirst's account of 'liberal education'? 
Firstly, to put Hirst in a fair perspective on the issues in 
question here, 1 suggest that the fundamental move which he 
makes, that is to argue that education is the development of mind
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through the acquisition of knowledge, is correct (is it
conceivable that education could not be concerned with such 
development?). The crucial problem is the kind of account which 
is given of knowledge so described. Once Hirst proceeds beyond 
this initial formulation his theory runs into trouble, as both
radical critics and 'APEa1 have argued.
Secondly, and more centrally, have the radical criticisms of 
Hirst's notion of liberal education demonstrated that the notion 
of liberal education has no place in an acceptable theory of 
education? It is striking that the radical critics see the use 
of the term 'liberal' in this context as unproblematic. The
question which must be asked here is whether Hirst's is indeed a 
liberal view of education. An alternative way of casting the
question is to ask whether this use of the term 'liberal 
education' exnausts the possible meanings which the expression 
could have.(38) I showed in Chapter 3 that the expression 
'liberal' does not have a fixed and given meaning. Similarly 
there is no simple answer to the question of what a liberal 
education is, or what a genuinely liberal view of education would 
be, A ease will be made in Chapter 6 for the argument that, in 
their emphasis on individual freedom, which is central to 
liberalism, P* S» Wilson and John White,(39) who can also be 
described as 'analytic' philosophers of education, offer a more 
clearly liberal starting point for an alternative notion of 
'liberal education'. Had the radicals taken the work of Wilson 
and White into account, they might have taken into consideration 
two liberal views of education which, albeit in different ways,
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emphasize the centrality of individual freedom of choice. Wilson 
is concerned with the definitive importance in education of the 
individual being allowed to discover what interests her and to 
choose to pursue activities which enable her to develop those 
interests. White, on the other hand, is concerned with ensuring 
that the individual pursues those activities which will increase 
her freedom to choose activities which she finds to be 
intrinsically valuable. I shall take up this argument in more 
detail in Chapter 6, having made the point here that radical 
objections to Hirst's notion of 'liberal education' should not be 
taken as the last word on the nature and desirability of liberal 
education, which raises further doubts about whether Hirst, or 
Peters for that matter, can be taken as straightforwardly 
representative of analytic philosophers of education. My point 
here will be strengthened by the argument below that Hirst's 
notion of education, like that of Peters, is more appropriately 
described as conservative than liberal.
Similarly, we need to ask whether Peters's notion of 'liberal 
education', which he sees as almost indistinguishable from the 
notion of education which he develops in Ethics and Education(AO) 
is indeed a liberal one. In raising this question 1 note, 
firstly, that Peters cites three features as traditionally lying 
behind the demand for 'liberal education'. These are that 
education should not be confined to serving extrinsic ends, that 
it should not be too specialized, and that it should not 
constrain beliefs in a doctrinaire way, Secondly, and 
problematically, Peters develops a notion of education as
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initiation into traditional modes of understanding which, I am 
going to argue in the following section, reflects a conservative 
rather than a liberal outlook. While Peters appears to see his 
account of the three features of 1 liberal education' as 
compatible with his notion of education as initiation, I 
maintain, on the grounds that his notion of education as 
initiation is a conservative one, that there is an 
incompatibility here. While the three features which Peters 
attributes to the notion of 'liberal education' may well be 
compatible with and even necessary to a liberal view of 
education, this does not entitle one to conclude that Peters is 
here providing us with the definitive account of liberal 
education or a liberal view of education.
Matthews raises two major objections against Peters's concept of 
schooling, which we should note here. His first objection is 
that Peters has a conception of schooling which is idealist and 
mistaken. Peters, observes Matthews, sees schools as concerned 
with initiation Into a worthwhile form of life. 'The schools 
share with churches and other institutions the "function of 
preserving and transmitting the ultimate values of society". 
Their raison d'etre is to "transmit what a community 
values".'(41) In addition to this primary function of schools, 
Peters acknowledges that society must produce goods and reproduce 
labour power. For Matthews, Peters is radically mistaken in 
referring to the training and selection function of schools as an 
instrumental function which is subsidiary to the primary function 
as he identifies it, According to Matthews, the primary and
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subsidiary functions as identified by Peters are the reverse of 
what is really the case; 'The selection and training of labour 
power is the main concern of a school system: education fits in
where it can'.(42)
Matthews's second objection is that not only is Peters's view of 
schooling idealist and mistaken but that it is also* in spite of 
Peters's methodological claim#, evaluative and prescriptive of a 
liberal view of schooling and of society.
Now regardless of the merits or otherwise of Matthews's two 
objections here, and bearing in mind that I have raised and will 
pursue later the problem of Peters's supposed commitment to a 
liberal view, I will again suggest that here we have criticisms 
of Peters's ideas which do not necessarily apply to liberal ideas 
in philosophy of education. It has, in other words, not been 
demonstrated that it is necessary to a liberal view that it
should make the two errors pointed to here by Matthews.
In sketching the central radical objections to the ideas of
Peters and Hirst, as 'representatives' of analytic philosophy of 
education, it has not boon part of my task to undertake any
detailed assessment of the work of Hirst and Peters or to deal 
comprehensively with the criticisms made of it by the radicals* 
Instead, I have suggested that the radical attack on the method, 
the epistetralogy and the views of schooling and education 
attributed to Hirst and Peters does not establish a case against 
liberal ideas in philosophy of education. My argument has
", oA,
pivoted on two considerations. The first has been to raise 
doubts about whether Hirst and Peters are either 
uncontroversially liberal or representative of analytic
philosophy of education. The second has been to point to the 
ambiguous description by the radicals of Hirst and Peters's work 
as both liberal and conservative. This second consideration I 
will take up in the next section. But before this, a brief 
remark about 'ideology'.
Each of the three aspects of 'APE' criticised by the radicals is
seen, crucially, to be open to analysis in terms of a theory of 
ideology. For Harris, the kind of work produced by Hirst and 
Peters fails to perceive that education, far from promoting 
knowledge, serves prevailing ideologies, thus promoting
ignorance.(A3) From a radical standpoint, for example, Hirst's 
view of knowledge ignores questions concerning the historically 
and socially determined production, reproduction and legitimation 
of knowledge, and fails to realize that knowledge reflects the 
interests of the dominant group in a society at a particular 
time. While claiming to use a detached and neutral method, and 
working from powerful positions as professors at respected
universities, Hirst and Peters sec the parameters for a method 
which developed a supportive rhetoric which legitimates the 
status quo,(44) But Hirst and Peters do not soe their work as 
ideological,(45) and that their very activity as theorists
requires analysis of the production of ideology.
I do not propose to be drawn into discussion of these issue's, or
to question the considerable relevance of theories of ideology to 
an understanding of the function performed by schooling. Instead 
I will suggest that, while these criticisms of Hirst and Peters 
may be correct, it has not been demonstrated that it is a
necessary feature of a liberal view of education or of philosophy 
of education that theories of ideology could not be taken into 
consideration, rather than ignored.
3
It is time to take up the question of whether Hirst and Peters 
can indeed be described as 'liberal', and I am going to question 
whether they should be. In doing so I shall show how the radical 
critics tend to contradict themselves by attributing both a 
liberal and a conservative position to Hirst and Peters.
We have noted how, while their radical critics associate the
ideas of Hirst and Peters with liberalism, they also describe
them as expressing ruling class interests, and those of the
status quo, as well as alleging that they are conservative. But 
there is a contradiction in this set of labels, for while one may 
associate a ruling class view and defence of the status quo with 
conservatism (and this too can be seen to bo problematic), this 
is not „ feature of liberalism. Liberalism and conservatism can 
be seen as basically incompatible points of view. This is 
certainly so for Roger Seruton, for whom 'the philosophy of 
liberalism' is 'the principal enemy of conservatism'.(46) I will 
return to a possible objection to this position later.
Matthews appears not to consider the possibility of such a 
clear-cut distinction between liberalism and conservatism as 
relevant to his considerations on Hirst and Peters, He points to 
the admiration of Hirst and Peters for the ideas of Michael 
Oakeshott, of all people, as evidence that they hold a liberal 
world view. Yet a reading of Oakeshott's essays,(47) 
particularly and obviously 'On Being a Conservative', does not 
bear out the assumption that his is a liberal world view. For 
Oakeshott the general characteristics of tbL, conservative 
disposition 'centre upon a propensity to use and to enjoy what is 
available rather than to wish for or to look for something else; 
to delight in what is present rather than what was or what may 
be'.(48) For Oakeshott, conservatism
is a disposition appropriate to a man who is acutely aware
of having something to lose which he has learned to care
for; a man in some degree rich in opportunities for 
enjoyment, but not so rich that he can afford to be
indifferent to loss ...
To be conservative, then, is to prefer the familiar to the 
unknown, to prefer the tried to the untried, fact to 
mystery, the actual to the possible, the limited to the
unbounded, the near to the distant, the sufficient to the 
superabundant, the convenient to the perfect, present 
laughter to utopian bliss.(49)
Distinguishing between change, to which, he argues, the 
conservative disposition is averse, and innovation, which may 
offer improvement and is more cautious and piecemeal, Oakeshott 
maintains that 'The man of conservative temperament believes that 
a known good is not lightly to be surrendered for an unknown 
better'.(50) Writing on political education he accepts the 
maxim, which I take to be central to the conservative position,
.
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'The world is the best of all possible worlds, and everything in 
it is a necessary evil'.(51) Emphasizing continuity, Scruton 
shares this outlook, writing that 'conservatism arises directly 
from the sense that one belongs to some continuing, and 
pre-existing social order, and that this fact is all-important in 
determining what to do'.(52) Scruton stresses that an existing 
social organism is presupposed in conservatism, whose politics is 
concerned with sustaining it.
I argued in Chapter 3 that the liberal position is to be 
understood as deriving its meaning from its central concern with 
the principle of 6 odividual freedom. At this point in the 
discussion we have two possible central characteristics of 
conservatism, concerning its attitude to the status quo, and to 
change. In the light of ray characterization of the liberal 
position we nan note that to emphasize, firstly, the virtues of 
what we have at present, which I am going to take as comprising 
what the radicals call the status quo, contrasted secondly with 
the uncertainties and risks of change, are not definitive 
features of liberalism, as they appear to be of conservatism. It 
is not a necessary feature of liberalism to endorse the present, 
which I am going to take as comprising what the radicals call the 
'status quo'. A glance at examples from the liberal tradition 
illustrates this.
I
What was distinctive of Locke's liberalism was, firstly, his 
defence of religious toleration, and secondly his defence of the 
individual's right to his property in the face of the Stuarts'
attempts to raise taxes on it without the consent of parliament. 
Locke rejected arguments which tried to justify the Stuarts' 
actions by appealing to the traditional notion of the divine 
right of kings. Mill's liberalism expressed itself in reaction 
chiefly to what he perceived as the tyranny of the majority and 
threats to freedom of speech and opinion. There is in these 
examples no simple relationship between the ideas in question and 
the status quo. Locke's liberalism is expressed in opposition to 
two elements of the status quo of his time: religious
intolerance and the tradition of the divine right of kings. In 
Mill's case the position is not as straightforward, as the major 
source of his concern to defend freedom of speech and opinion was 
the issue of the extension of the franchise, and he saw universal 
suffrage as a threat to individual liberty. But, although Mill 
was sceptical about such change, endorsement of the status quo is 
not central to the liberal ideas which he expressed. Of course 
if could be argued that both Locke and Mill were defending ruling 
class interests, but my response to this would be that it is not 
a necessary feature of the liberal point of view that it should 
be either an expression or a defence of ruling class interests. 
This can be seen in the examples of liberal feminism and the 
African National Congress in South Africa before it entered its 
radical phase in the early 1960s.
The notions of defending the status quo and of opposition to 
change, which are the main focus of interest here, do not offer 
cut and dried formulae for distinguishing between conservatism 
and liberalism. There were, as we have noted, features of the
status quo which Mill would have preferred to retain. Nor is 
defence of the status quo unproblematically characteristic of 
conservatism. For some conservatives - Thatcher and Reagan
spring to mind - there may well be features of the status quo
which require quite radical action for change. Although, as 
Oakeshott argues, we can attribute to the conservative position a 
preference for innovation rather than change, we have to take 
this as a common but not necessary feature of the conservative 
position. And we cannot draw a clear contrast on the criteria of
either defence of the status quo or opposition to change, between
liberalism and conservatism, for it is not the desire for change 
per se which is distinctive of the liberal position (or absent 
from the conservative). The liberal may regard retention of 
certain aspects of the status quo as vital.
We need to look rather at the issue of what concerns are 
fundamental to conservatism and liberalism in order to grasp the 
contrast between the two positions, I have already made it clear 
that for the liberal it is the defence of individual freedom 
which is central and definitive of her position. To this I 
should now add the observation that defence of this principle 
will in general be more fundamental to the liberal position than 
defence of any other. I have argued that there are various 
associated principles in terms of which the liberal will 
interpret the central, and I now add fundamental, one of defence 
of individual freedom. The possibility of one of the former 
overriding the latter will be discussed in Chapter 7, but will 
not undermine my argument here. What i« fundamental, by
contrast, to the conservative position is a feature emphasised by 
both Oakeshott and Scruton, namely the value attached by
conservatives to the present, not: simply as the status quo, but
as embodying a continuing social order comprising institutions
and conditions with a continuity with the past. It is worth
noting that to value these institutions and traditions is not the 
same as endorsing all aspects of the status quo, for example the 
conservative position thus described is not necessarily committed° 
to the current distribution of wealth in a society.
In the light of these considerations it is simply confused to 
suggest that Peters is both a liberal and a conservative. But 
perhaps the most serious mistake which the radicals make here is 
to use labels like 'liberal' and 'conservative' too 
simplisticaliy. A virtue of conceptual analysis is, at least, 
that it encourages ue to be sensitive to such distinctions. I am 
not going to make the same mistake by suggesting that Peters is a 
conservative. But I would agree with the observation that in 
certain respects Peters is conservative in outlook. Matthews is 
correct in describing as 'typically conservative1(53) the 
concluding statement of Ethics and Education. 'The most 
worthwhile features of political life are Immanent in the 
institutions which we in fact have'.(54) Peters shares 
Oakeshott's appreciation of the tried and familiar as part of an 
existing social order. This emphasis on the value of the present 
institutions in society is the presupposition underlying Peters's 
notion of education as initiation* to which we now turn, via a 
look at Matthews's treatment of Hirst as also both 'liberal' and 
'conservative'.
Just as Peters's admiration for Oakeshott must sooner establish 
conservative rather than liberal leanings, so too with Hirst. 
Matthews describes Oakeshott's 'liberal' world view as having led 
Oakeshott to title the essay* from which Hirst chooses an extract 
to conclude 'Liberal Education and the Nature of Knowledge', 'The 
Voice of Poetry in the Conversation of Mankind'. Matthews points 
in particular to Hirst's quoting Oakeshott's opinion that 
'Education, properly speaking, is an initiation into the skill 
and partnership of this conversation In which we learn to 
recognise the voices, to distinguish the proper occasions of 
utterance'.(55) Again, I would suggest that Matthews is on shaky 
ground in taking evidence of an admiration for a conservative 
thinker as evidence that Hirst adopts a liberal view. But 
further, Matthews points to an issue here which brings us to the 
core of Hirst and Peters's notion of education, and of their 
conservatism in this respect.
In the passage quoted by Hirst, to which Matthews refers, 
Oakeshott advances a notion of 'education as initiation into a 
civilization'. 'It is', he writes, 'the ability to participate 
in this conversation ... which distinguishes the human being from 
the animal and the civilized man from the barbarian'. (56) There 
is much in common here with, and an inspiration not only for 
Peters's notion of education as initiation into wore,awhile 
activities, understood in terms of traditional modes of 
understanding. This notion of education as 'initiation into a 
civilization1 can also be seen as an inspiration for the notion 
implicit in Hirst's idea of education as initiation into the
traditional 'ways in which human knowledge has come to have
shape'*(57) which Hirst articulates in his forms of knowledge 
thesis* Matthews is correct in describing such a view of
education, which both Hirst and Peters share with Oakeshott, as 
'conservative', emphasizing as it does the value of current 
institutions and traditions, and of continuity, Matthews draws 
this emphasis out when he refers to
Peters' image of teachers as taking the role of the priests
who used to introduce successive generations of individuals 
into the "various aspects of a culture within which the 
individual has eventually to determine where he stands". 
Far from viewing this as a threat to the status quo, Peters 
indeed overtly supports it. He sees our "current political 
and cultural institutions as embodying the very values of 
civilization which teachers should be striving to uphold 
and create".(58)
This conservative feature of Peters and Hirst's work is crucial
to the position which I wish to defend in this discussion* that 
their work, and the criticisms of it by the radical critics in 
question* cannot be token as demonstrating the failure of liberal 
ideas in philosophy of education. A notion of education as 
initiation is not, however, peculiar to a conservative view of 
education. I will show in Chapter 9 how, in spite of their 
attack on the view of education held by Hirst and Peters, the 
radicals themselves adopt a view of education which involves 
initiation* albeit Into 'worthwhile activities' of a different 
kind, I must emphasise that as with the notions of defence of 
the status quo and resistance to change, that of initiation is 
not the central and definitive characteristic. What is 
distinctive of a conservative notion of education is the idea of 
initiation into traditions of understanding, reflecting the
conservative preoccupation with the value of traditions as 
reflecting continuity with the past.
I must now return to a possible objection, raised but not
discussed above. This objection questions my argument that
liberalism and conservatism are basically Incompatible points of
view, and it could be advanced by arguing that examples could be
cited of views or opinions on particular issues which are not
clearly identifiable as either liberal or conservative. For
example, it could be possible to defend certain kinds of freedom,
*
say freedom of opinion and expression, with some restrictions on 
libel or obscenity, on both liberal and conservative grounds. 
So, if might be argued, it is misleading to suggest that 
liberalism and conservatism are clearly distinguishable positions.
In response to this move, I would agree that examples can be 
found, like this one, where both a liberal and a conservative 
could advance a similar opinion. But such examples could not 
carry the weight of an objection to the argument that liberalism 
and conservatism are distinguishable and ultimately incompatible 
positions. My reason for arguing this is that at the core of 
liberalism and conservatism are, as I have suggested, very 
different ideas of what is fundamental. It is the ideas which 
are fundamental which characterise these positions. But 
nonetheless these positions can produce particular opinions or 
views of quite similar content, e.g. on freedom of opinion and 
expression, But while it is possible to hold fairly similar 
opinions on such issues, the reasons for holding such opinions,
as either a liberal or a conservative, are different. I have 
already suggested that the central and characterizing feature of 
the liberal point of view is a fundamental concern for the 
principle of individual freedom, while for the conservative it is 
the value attached to present institutions, of being part of a 
social organism with a continuity with the past. Beyond these 
two central and definitive features, each position may comprise a 
constellation of further particular ideas, which are related 
differently to other principles. Thus while the principle of 
freedom is central to and definitive of liberalism, where it is a 
good in itself, it occupies a different kind of place in 
conservatism, for Scruton the concept of freedom 'cannot occupy 
a central place in conservative thinking' but is 'comprehensible 
as a social goal only when subordinate to something else, to an 
organization or arrangement which defines the original aim1.(59) 
The freedom that Englishmen enjoy 'is a specific personal 
freedom* the result of a long process of social evolution, the 
bequest of institutions without whose protection it could not 
endure, freedom in this sense ... is not the precondition but 
the consequence of an accepted social arrangement'«(60) Thus, 
while Peters pays some attention to the notion of freedom, 
devoting a chapter to it in Ethics and Education, this does not 
establish that his is a liberal view of education, His notion of 
education, like Hirst's, is more appropriately described as 
conservative.
But another way that the objection to the distinction between 
liberalism and conservatism might run could be to argue that in
their effects the two positions are not different from one 
another, that there is a phoney dispute between them. From a 
certain radical point of view the criterion according to which 
positions are to be distinguished and judged is whether they do 
or do not bring about revolutionary change, in other words 
whether they are or are not part of a revolutionary praxis. But 
the problem for those involved in any theoretical consideration 
of these matters is that to be involved in serious consideration 
of the issues in question must surely be to commit oneself to 
taking seriously conceptual distinctions like that between 
liberalism and conservatism. Besides, it is doubtful whether the 
effects of liberalism and conservatism are the same. To hold 
that they are would be to pretend that there was little 
difference between, say, the roles of the middle class and the 
old aristocracy in the Industrial Revolution, To hold that the 
effects of liberalism and conservatism are the same is 
illegitimately to run together two political stances which 
represent two poles of continuing political struggles. While 
within a radical approach to political theory political practice 
is a central preoccupation, this certainly should not be taken to 
mean that political theory can be collapsed into political 
practice. This way of objecting to the distinction between 
liberalism and conservatism is not worth further consideration.
I have challenged in this chapter the popular radical stance 
which holds that liberal ideas in philosophy of education have 
been effectively discredited, This radical position rests on the 
assumption that the work of Hirst and Peters exemplifies and
represents ' liberal1 analytic philosophy of education. My 
challenge to this assumption has been to argue* firstly, that 
Hirst and Peters are more accurately described as, in certain 
fundamental respects, conservative in outlook. Secondly, I have 
questioned whether Hirst and Peters are, as is assumed by their 
radical critics, representatives of analytic philosophy of 
education. Examination of the work of Wilson and White in 
Chapter 6 will show them to be much better examples of liberal 
philosophers of education, because they are each fundamentally, 
unlike Hirst and Peters, concerned with defending the central 
liberal principle of Individual freedom. Before taking up that 
argument, I will deal in the next chapter with the radical 
argument that the dominant tradition in studies of education in 
South Africa is a liberal one.
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CHAPTER 5
IS THE DOMINANT TRADITION IN STUDIES OF EDUCATION IN SOUTH AFRICA 
A LIBERAL ONE?
1
My task in Chapter 4 was to show that the radical critics are 
wrong to take Hirst and Peters as representatives of liberal 
philosophy of education* Hirst and Peters, I argued, are in 
respect of the notion of education they hold more appropriately 
described as conservative. 1 i/ning to radical criticisms of 
* liberal1 studies of educ *0n in South Africa, I will now 
discuss my second major example of an area of; theory of education 
Where the radicals mistakenly describe the views in question as 
1liberal' rather than 'conservative1.
The growth of a radical literature on education in South Africa 
is an exciting and welcome development. South African work 
within this paradigm is in an embryonic state by comparison with 
the more extensive radical literature elsewhere, in Australia for 
example.(1) Peter Kallaway'a collection, Apartheid and 
Education(2) is therefore a significant and overdue addition to 
published work on education in this country.
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A clear tendency in the growing radical literature on South 
African education is its rejection of 1 the whole "liberal" 
education tradition that is dominant in South African society at 
large'. (3) It is argued that ' the study of education in this 
country has to date been dominated by the liberal convention, and 
has in consequence taken place within the context of a set of 
unquestioned ideological presuppositions1. (4) I am going to take 
it that those who adopt the radical stance, in holding the view 
that the 1 dominant tradition' in studies of education in South 
Africa is a 'liberal' one, maintain that most of the influential 
texts on education in South Africa have been written from a 
'liberal' stance. In response to this position I intend to argue 
that the radical critics are mistaken in suggesting that the 
dominant tradition in studies of education in South Africa is a 
liberal one. In doing so I shall show that there is some 
confusion in radical circles about the use of the term 'liberal' 
and that the criteria of the liberal tradition implied in the 
radical criticisms of it are inadequate.
In examining the radical arguments against the 'dominant liberal 
tradition' I am going to take the arguments in question as 
suggesting three criteria of 'liberal' studies. Although the 
radicals are mistaken in thinking that these criteria can be used 
to characterise a liberal position, I shall for the sake of the 
argument adopt these criteria in investigating the arguments 
which reflect them. I shall also suggest, in section 2, that two 
additional more central criteria need to be considered and, in 
section 3, that the examples of writers cited by the radicals
generally fail to satisfy these additional criteria. Section 4 
will illustrate further the lack of rigour in the radical attack 
on 'liberal' studies of education in South Africa by focussing on 
the alleged overemphasis by the 'liberals' on the significance 
for black education of the coming to power of the National Party 
in 1948. As with my treatment of the radical arguments against 
Hirst and Peters, I set out to show in the present chapter that 
the radicals have not established that liberal theory of 
education has been discredited.
2
let us establish first the arguments against 'liberal' studies of 
education in South Africa asserted by the radicals and the 
criteria of 'liberal' implicit in these arguments. Commenting on 
the standard texts on the history of South African education, 
Kallaway notes
a picture of neglect and indifference regarding black 
education. E G Pells allocated the subject some 22 out of 
152 pages (or 15 per cent of his text), Rupert! about 12 
per cent and J 0 Goetzee 20 per cent, Behr represents some 
Improvement with over 50 per cent of his book being devoted 
to black education (20 per cent to African education), and 
Brian Rose's collection of essays moves conclusively 
towards a more balanced presentation with more than 75 per 
cent of his section on South Africa being concerned with 
black education.(5)
Kallaway comments further that published work in this field
has been almost exclusively descriptive and empiricist in 
conception. Liberal writers on the history of education in 
South Africa have tended to take education policy 
statements and statements of intent by politicians and
officials at face value. For example, the citing of the 
notorious statements by Dr H F Verwoerd on the nature of 
Bantu Education have never been matched by detailed 
research into the nature of the schooling system to 
ascertain whether these policy statements really did 
reflect the practice in the schools during the 1950s.(6)
Commenting similarly,(7) Mary Crewe writes that studies in this 
tradition are
works which are predominantly descriptive, catalogues of 
disparities in education and information collecting rather 
than critical. Where they are analytical the analysis 
remains on an introverted level and doesn't yield proposals 
for alternatives. Further they are almost all oriented 
towards White education, emphasising the split between 
English and Afrikaans and referring to the other education 
systems in passing, Virtually no works exist which view 
the education systems in an interrelated way as part of 
South African society as an integrated whole.(8)
Crewe identifies as works within the paradigm in question
E Q Malherbe, Education in South Africa, E G Pells, Three 
Hundred Years of Education in South Africa, and more
recently the works of a small group of writers such as 
A Bohr and R MacMillan, B Rose, D A Duminy, R Tunmer, and 
... works from outside education faculties produced by 
Sprocas and the SAIRR.(9)
A problem in setting out to evaluate the validity of the 
criticisms in question is that the critics of the dominant
1 liberal paradigm* are clearly not unanimous in citing the works 
which they regard as part of this paradigm* It is worth noting, 
however, that Colin Collins(10) also cites Pells as such an
example, while Pam Christie and Colin Collins(11) also refer to
Brian Rose and Raymond Tunmer, and to Muriel Morrell who worked 
under the auspices of the SAIRR. But bearing in mind these 
problems of Identifying examples, we can discern so far three
common accusations against the dominant 1 liberal1 tradition of 
studying education: first, that the emphasis has been on white
education, while black education has been neglected; second, 
that such studies have been largely descriptive and lacking in 
analysis and critique; third, that their superficiality in 
analysis has resulted in a failure to see education as 
interrelated with other features of South African society.(12) 
There is a further criticism of 'liberal' studies of education 
which is of a different order, which I shall take up in section 4 
below. In the absence of further specific attempts to identify 
the features of the 'liberal tradition' in question we shall have 
to take these three criticisms as implicitly reflecting also the 
alleged characteristics or criteria of the 'liberal' tradition.
This is the 'liberal' tradition as characterised from within the 
paradigm of radical historiography* A more complete account of 
the liberal tradition must include reference to the ideas or 
principles in terms of which the liberal tradition, in its 
broadest sense* not merely in South Africa, has expressed 
itself. Centrally, liberal ideas have in common the defence of 
the principle of individual freedom. As I have shown in 
Chapter 3, this has taken different forms at different times, 
o,g, the defence of freedom of ideas or expression, or of certain 
rights, a call for tolerance* or an emphasis on the principle of 
equality, depending on the historical context in which they are 
expressed.
In the South African context liberal Ideas hove a complex 
history, reflecting a peculiar character of their own, I am now 
going to give a brief indication of the character of liberal
ideas in this context but must emphasise that my intentions are 
modest, in that I do not propose to give the subject detailed 
treatment. Considering the record of liberalism in the decades 
following the National Party's election victory in 1948 (the 
period in which the 'liberal' studies in question were written), 
we find the peculiar character of South African liberalism
reflected in the policies and actions of the United Party. The
UP was east, in the years following 1948, as the 'liberal' 
opposition to the National Party government. Janet Robertson 
points out that 'The United Party stood, for the preservation of 
principles and methods historically associated with the Western 
liberal tradition - minimum government interference with the 
rights of the individual, the rule of law, the inviolability of 
the constitution, and the independence of the judiciary'.(13)
But while these principles for which the United Party stood can 
be seen to place it within the liberal tradition as I have
characterised it, it is necessary at this point to Invoke the
third of the three senses in which, as I suggested at the close 
of Chapter 3, the word 'liberal* can be used, It will be
recalled that I suggested there th&t wo need to distinguish
between 'liberal* in the mistaken sense in which the radicals use 
it, and liberal in the sense of the liberal tradition,
characterised by its central concern to defend individual 
freedom, with variations in its expression depending on the
context. While it is the use of 'liberal' in the second sense 
which I have been mainly concerned to defend, I pointed also to a 
third sense, in which, accepting the broad characterization of
the liberal tradition which I have defended, and from within a 
liberal framework, one considers what a defensible version of 
liberalism could be. The best example of this kind of 
deliberation in my argument will be the discussion of Milton 
Friedman's liberalism in Chapter 7. It is in this third sense 
that we can appraise the peculiar expressions of the liberal 
point of view in both the United Party and the Liberal Party in 
South Africa. For while the United Party paid lip-service to the 
principles of the Western liberal tradition, its 'liberalism' was 
corrupted by its wish to maintain white political control, and it 
was opposed to the extension of full equality to blacks in an 
integrated society. While it defended the existing privileges of 
the coloureds, it did not press for integration, or an extension 
of their rights. Its 'liberalism' was thus highly ambiguous and 
largely a function of its opposition to the Government's methods 
of maintaining white supremacy. Robertson observes that
the ways by which the government proposed to enforce 
apartheid aroused non-Nationalisb fears for the freedoms of 
whites in South Africa, And consequently the defence of 
liberal methods seemed as important to non-Nationalists as 
the pursuit of liberal aims. Thus, in tho lengthy debates 
on apartheid legislation in the first term of Nationalist 
rule, non-Nationalists wore encouraged to see the United 
Party, in contrast with the Nationalists, as tho defenders 
of liberty,(14)
Even tho Liberal Party, although tho general principles for which 
it stood wore clearly liberal ones, e.g. human dignity, human 
rights and democratic participation, did not embrace universal 
adult suffrage until I960. It adopted tho principle of a 
qualified franchise at its first National Conference in 1953,(15) 
thus calling into question its commitment to the principle of
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